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During the transition from plan to market, financial system reform is play-
ing a key role by linking the three major reform areas. Financial liberalization -
notably the liberalization of the domestic banking system -has implications for
the success of monetary and fiscal stabilization. It has an impact on the effect of
the liberalization of prices, and it closely relates to the overhaul of. the institu-
tional infrastructures of the economies. The potential contribution of banks to this
process depends on the type of financial system that is being implemented. Be-
cause the emergence of a particular financial system is to a large extent path de-
pendent (Patrick, 1995), the selection of an appropriate reform strategy early on
is thus of major importance.
The purpose of this paper is to review the arguments that have been
brought forward in favor or against different types of financial systems, to assess
their relevance for the Eastern European setting, and to present empirical evi-
dence as to the actual financial structures that are emerging. Incidentally, the em-
pirical assessment of the reform process to date largely has to rely on anecdotal
evidence. Little microeconomic evidence on the role of banks in the corporate
governance and restructuring of firms is available, and no representative studies
of the banking industries have so far been made. Hence, the present paper can
only outline some major trends that seem to prevail and that are supported by the
data.
After describing the major goals of the reform process (Part 2), the paper
proceeds by analyzing the costs and benefits of different types of financial sys-
tems and briefly reviews some lessons from developed and developing market
economies (Part 3). Particular attention is assigned to the potential merits of a
universal banking system. Subsequently, the empirical evidence from Eastern
Europe is being presented (Part 4). Part 5 concludes.
The analysis focuses on the experience of the more advanced reform states
of Eastern Europe, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. All these
countries have actually already opted for some form of universal banking system.
This paper has been written during a research visit of the author at the New York
University Salomon Center. The research that is being presented in this paper has
been conducted in the context of a research project on "Financial Markets in the
Transformation Process — Precondition or Result of Successful Reforms?". Fi-
nancial support of the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.There is thus little scope for discussing optimal initial policies. Yet, the ap-
proaches which the countries have chosen in order to involve banks in the process
of enterprise restructuring are far from being uniform, and it should be interesting
to see what effects the reforms have had for bank behavior. The findings of this
paper furthermore provide insights into required reform elements in those
economies further East which have not yet effectively started to reform their
banking systems. Also, the results should help to resolve regulatory questions mat
come up in the countries under review.
II. GOALS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORM
Ultimately, the main goal of the transformation process is to move the
economies in transition from an inefficient production point well below their pro-
duction possibility frontier towards a point on their transformation curve and to
allow for sustained economic growth. In order to achieve these goals, the process
of central planning has to be replaced by a system of market-based decision
making which allows efficiency gains to be realized. The financial system plays a
key role in this process because it links the savings and investment decisions
within an economy.
1 Banks and other financial intermediaries thus have to offer
savings vehicles which provide incentives to save, and they should allocate the fi-
nancial funds to their most efficient uses. Enabling intermediaries to detect profit-
able investment opportunities is therefore a crucial task of reforms.
' i The efficiency of the allocation of financial resources is closely linked to
th£ ability of banks to overcome informational asymmetries in financial markets.
These asymmetries arise because firms are typically better informed about the
quality of their investment projects than outside investors. Yet, to the extent that
information has public good characteristics, this information gap cannot simply be
overcome by selling information to potential investors (Leland/Pyle, 1977). As
Diamond (1984) has shown, banks contribute to reducing asymmetries in infor-
mation by utilizing economies of scale when monitoring borrowers. The joint fi-
nancing of investment projects and the intermediation of financial funds through
Financial system reform also has major implications for the conduct of macro-
economic stabilization programs. Yet, these issues are not directly dealt with in
this paper. The interdependence between banking sector reform and monetary pol-
icy is, for example, discussed in Buch (1995).banking institutions becomes cheaper than their separate provision.
2 In addition
to the problems arising from asymmetries in information, general uncertainty
about the quality of a loan customers is inherent to any lending contract. This is
because loans can be viewed as put options written on the (uncertain) future in-
come streams of an enterprise.
The above reasoning implies why efficient financial intermediaries and in
particular banks are of special relevance for the transition economies. First,
asymmetries in information are of greater importance in the transition economies
than in developed Western market economies. Standardized contracts and loan
assessment procedures hardly exist. Many enterprises cannot offer sufficiently
long track records, and loan assessment systems are too underdeveloped to sup-
port the analysis even of the available accounting information. Transaction costs
comprising the cost of measuring, the cost of enforcement, and the costs of im-
personal exchanges (North, 1992) are thus substantial in these markets. Second,
banks have traditionally been the major players in the (nascent) financial systems
and are unlikely to be challenged by other non-bank intermediaries in the near
future. One key goal of reforms should thus be to improve the efficiency of exist-
ing intermediaries and to enhance their ability to support real sector adjustment.
More specifically, the scale and efficiency of real sector restructuring will,
on the one hand, depend on the degree to which new, private enterprises can
emerge. Successfully supporting the emergence of private enterprises, i.e. the pri-
vatization from below, mainly requires ex ante informational asymmetries to be
overcome.
3 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that asymmetries in informa-
tion in credit markets can lead to adverse selection effects and to equilibrium
credit rationing. In such a scenario, some borrowers are excluded from the credit
market although they would be willing to pay the market interest rate. Credit ra-
tioning is less likely to occur if (i) borrowers have sufficient net worth and can
thus offer collateral to secure their loans and if (ii) banks operate in a competitive
environment (Bester, 1985; Calomiris/Hubbard, 1990; Hellwig, 1988). Yet, these
conditions do not apply to the Eastern European situation, and they are particu-
larly violated for the cases of small, new enterprises. Small new firms do not have
records of past performance, and they have typically few assets which might
Financial intermediaries thus emerge endogenously in these models. Williamson
(1987) shows this for the case of ex post asymmetric information on the behavior
of borrowers.
These asymmetries occur before finance is granted and relate to the fact that bor-
rowers know the quality of their investment projects which lenders cannot observe.serve as collateral at their disposal. Hence, credit to small firms is likely to be ra-
tioned, allowing only those firms to stay in business which can finance their ex-
pansion from internally generated funds. Growth would be suboptimal in such a
scenario because profitable firms which projects yield high returns only after
some periods would be excluded from the credit market. Establishing a financial
system which contributes to overcoming ex ante informational asymmetries and
to providing finance to these firms would thus be growth-promoting.
On the other hand, the adjustment of existing state-owned enterprises to the
new environment is of key importance for successful real sector restructuring. In
the case of existing state-owned enterprises, the potential role of financial inter-
mediaries is most importantly related to overcoming ex post informational asym-
metries and to impose effective mechanisms of corporate control on these firms.
As Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994, p. 52) note although free market prices are
certainly necessary for a proper functioning of the economy, the processing of
the information conveyed by the prices and the economically desirable re-
sponses to market signals at the enterprise level require the existence of an ap-
propriate corporate governance structure. The successful privatization of state-
owned firms - i.e. the privatization from above - thus implies that a new govern-
ance structure needs to be found which can bridge the gap that the withdrawal of
state control creates.
In particular at the early transformation stage, state-owned enterprises tend
to have fairly easy access to credit resources because of their well-established
relationships with the existing banks. Yet, the efficient utilization of these funds is
crucial. If, however, the actions of firm management cannot easily be observed by
outsiders, moral hazard problems are likely to occur in the predominantly large
state-owned enterprises. These moral hazard problems are due to different objec-
tive functions of the principal and of his agent. In a market-type setting, the own-
ers of an enterprise are interested in maximizing the present value of the firm,
hence preferring profitable, high-risk projects. Yet, the firm's management may
be seeking to guarantee itself a certain fixed salary while minimizing the effort
that it has to put up in order to receive this remuneration. Hence, managers may
rather be interested in choosing low-return, low-risk projects. Because stakehold-
ers cannot observe whether good performance is due to the efforts of the man-
agement or instead due to favorable external factors, they may reward manage-
ment even if its effort level has been low (Bos/Peters, 1989).In the Eastern European setting, agency problems and possible divergences
of objective functions are even more complex than in the simple scenario above.
Most importantly, the government as the owner of state enterprises may not be
seeking to maximize profits but rather to maintain employment at its current level
or to extract short-term dividends from the firms. It may thus not seek to maxi-
mize the overall present value of its assets. At the same time, the organizational
structure of firms is typically more diffuse. Workers often have an important say
in enterprise affairs and managers may try to engage in some type of asset strip-
ping, intending to maximize their own personnel wealth. While a discussion of
different management compensation schemes as well as of the complexity of
principal-agent relationships that can be observed in reality is beyond the scope
of this paper, it is important to note that differences in objective functions require
mechanisms of corporate control to be implemented. This requirement is more
pronounced for the large state-owned enterprises rather than for small, new enter-
prises in which ownership and control are less likely to be separated. In other
words, financial systems that allow for an efficient corporate control structure of
state-owned enterprises before, during, and after privatization will promote
growth.
III. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DIFFERENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
The previous section has shown that banks and other financial intermediar-
ies can contribute to the reduction of ex ante informational asymmetries by allow-
ing more efficient firms to be selected from a pool of seemingly identical custom-
ers as well as by reducing ex post informational asymmetries by improving the
corporate governance of firms. This section will analyze to what extent different
financial systems are suited to achieve these goals.
1. Types of Financial Systems
Generally, quite a few classifications of financial systems can be found in
the literature. In this paper, the focus will be on the potential benefits of a univer-
sal as opposed to a separated banking system. In some cases, universal banks are
simply labeled as those banks which offer ,,all" kinds of financial services, as op-
posed to those specialized" banks which concentrate their activities only in a
few areas. Yet, such a broad classification has two flaws. First, it leaves out of
consideration whether banks voluntarily decide to specialize only into a certain
range of activities or whether the observed limitations are the result of regulations
that have been imposed on the banks. Second, the above classification does notallow a separation between certain key areas in which financial intermediaries
may be active. Yet, as will be shown below, spill-overs between the lending and
the securities business as well as the possibility of banks to hold equity stakes in
firms are relevant when discussing the costs and benefits of universal banking
systems.
In order to give a general classification of financial systems, this paper
follows Steinherr (1995) who differentiates between bank- and market-based fi-
nancial systems on the one hand and between universal and specialized banks on
the other hand. In a market-based financial system, markets for debt and equity
play an important role in attracting and allocating financial funds. In such a sys-
tem - as opposed to a bank-based system —, external equity finance is typically
more important than debt finance, and debt finance itself is more likely to be
raised through bond markets rather than through bank loans. Although universal
banking systems are typically classified as bank-based financial systems, market-
based financial systems can also display features of universal banking. The Brit-
ish financial system is a case in point. While market-based institutional structures
dominate the process of financial intermediation, banks are universal in the sense
that the underwriting of securities can be performed by separately incorporated
institutions under the roof of a common holding company.
4 In order to simplify
the discussion, this paper will take their ability to control firm management
through the equity positions that they hold in the firms as the most important
feature of universal banks. In addition to equity holdings, institutional arrange-
ments such as proxy votings or board membership of bankers within firms can
give universal banks equity-like control rights (Harm, 1992). Furthermore, univer-
sal banks are allowed to underwrite securities whereas in a separated banking
system, commercial and investment banking activities are strictly separated.
In the transition economies, the method that is being chosen for the privati-
zation of state-owned enterprises has important implications for the type of fi-
nancial system that is emerging.
5 Choosing a voucher privatization method such
as in the Czech Republic or in Russia - more recently also in Poland - implies
that a large amount of equity becomes publicly traded, thus tending to promote
In other words, a bank-based universal banking system is identical to a fully inte-
grated universal banking system whereas the British model resembles a bank sub-
sidiary structure (Saunders/Walter, 1994, p. 67).
See also Frydman/Rapaczynski (1994). Earle/Frydman/Rapaczynski et al. (1993)
and Frydman et al. (1993) describe and analyze the privatization strategies in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe.7
the evolution of a market-based financial systems. Yet, as will be shown below
(Section IV. 1.2.), even a voucher privatization method may lead to the concen-
tration of ownership stakes in a comparatively small number of investment funds.
Choosing a direct sales method for the privatization of state-owned firms such as
in Hungary or in Estonia is, in contrast, more likely to contribute to the emer-
gence of single, large stakeholders. While the paper will not go into details about
the advantages and disadvantages of different privatization methods, it will
nonetheless be important to bear in mind that the choice of a specific privatization
method influences the structure of financial markets and the form of the corporate
governance system.
2. Needed Institutional Infrastructure
Asymmetries in information and the resulting agency problems are a con-
cern in both, debt and equity contracts. Hence, for either debt or equity holders to
perform their control functions efficiently and to exercise their control rights,
certain institutional structures must be present. Yet, reforming the institutional in-
frastructure of the transition economies is one of the most time consuming tasks
to be achieved, and incomplete frameworks for the operations of financial inter-
mediaries prevail (Table 1).
The enforcement of debt contracts is costly because lenders do generally
not have a direct influence on management decisions during the term of a loan
contract. Hence, assessing the quality of an investment project ex ante is of key
importance. Active ex ante debt holder monitoring thus crucially depends on the
availability of information on investment projects. In addition, active debt holder
control is most likely to occur if one large debt holder exists and if the interests of
creditors can be bundled. Hence, in the presence of a large number of small
creditors of a firm, mechanisms should be designed that allow relatively large
debt holders to take control, to coordinate creditor interests, and to implement a
restructuring program. This also requires seniority issues to be clarified in order
to improve incentives of creditors to foster restructuring.
Once a loan agreement has been signed, creditors have little control over
the action of management. Only if debt contracts are sufficiently flexible can
creditors affect borrower incentives by, for example, threatening not to prolong a
loan. Adverse incentives on part of the borrower can also be mitigated by impo-
sing bankruptcy penalties or collateral requirements on the borrowers, or by in-
vesting into monitoring activities. Passive debt holder monitoring is thus more8
likely to occur if the legal framework for the provision of collateral is given and if
information on the value of collateral can be obtained at low costs. This requires,
above all, that property rights are clearly defined and enforceable through the le-
gal system. These conditions, however, are often not fulfilled in the economies in
transition. Here, the legal frameworks are weak, and markets for goods that can
serve as collateral are neither deep nor liquid.
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deep and liquid markets for
property and real estate; legal
definition of property rights;






Corporate law that foresees
strong ownership rights; large
and active stakeholders with
market-based incentives; dis-
closure requirements.
Evaluation of business plans
(ex ante) and enterprise restruc-
turing (ex post).
Conditions:
Presence of large debt holders
with hard budget constraints
and market-based incentives;
reliable accounting systems; ex-
perienced loan administrators;
flexibility of loan agreements;
disclosure requirements; ; clear
seniority rules.
Sources: Bear/Gray (1994); Dittus/Prowse (1994).
Because of the difficulties associated with the enforcement of debt con-
tracts, Cho (1986, pp. 192) proposes to focus on the promotion of efficient stock
markets over the course of financial development. Generally, active monitoring is
indeed more likely under equity than under debt finance because owners may
have inside information on the firm and because they have a greater influence on
management action than debt holders do. In addition, owners should have incen-
tives to engage into (risky) high-yield projects because they share the eventually
high returns, thus promoting enterprise restructuring. Yet,'if active large share-
holders that can actually exercise these rights are not present, only passive moni-toring may be possible. Passive monitoring through selling and buying shares, in
turn, requires equity markets to be sufficiently deep and liquid. Furthermore, dis-
closure rules must be relatively rigid, allowing outsiders to gain sufficient insight
into the quality of a firm's operations. However, because of the illiquidity of eq-
uity markets, a lack of experience with financial instruments, the weakness of
regulatory bodies with enforcing disclosure rules as well as the poorstate of their
accounting systems, the countries in transition can hardly rely on security markets
to perform passive monitoring (Dittus/Prowse, 1994).
Because of the problems with performing effective corporate governance
under both, debt and equity finance, the Eastern European reform states should
eliminate barriers to the functioning of each system. Improvements in the infor-
mation systems and the creation of an appropriate legal framework support both,
the potential for effective debt and equity holder control. In addition, since active
monitoring in both cases rests on the presence of a dominant equity or debt
holder, respectively, the rights of these groups should be clarified. Since debt fi-
nance dominated as a source of outside finance under central planning, it may be
advisable to strengthen the rights of banks in this process.
6 Chen, Weston, and
Altman (1994) indeed suggest that banks can play a lead role in debt restructuring
cases because of their ability to facilitate negotiations among creditors and be-
cause of the superior information on firms that they have.
In addition to their strong role as creditors of firms, banks may have an in-
terest in providing debt contracts with equity-like components. Such a contingent
transfer of rights benefits banks because moral hazard problems, which would put
the entire invested capital at risk in the bad state of the world, can be mitigated.
7
At the same time, banks receive a safe return in the good state of the world with-
in former Czechoslovakia, for example, firms financed 17-22 percent of their in-
vestment in the time period between 1980 and 1991 from bank loans. Yet, far more
important have been internal sources of finance such as depreciation (45-60 per-
cent) and retained earnings (16-25 percent) (Capek, 1994).
In a study on the German banking system, Harm (1992) found that the combined
use of debt and equity-like components leads to such a contingent transfer of
rights. In Germany, many debt contracts include authority provisions such as board
seats, proxy votes, and equity ownership of banks in enterprises. Similarly, Japa-
nese banks hold large equity stakes in enterprises and are highly involved in the fi-
nancial affairs of companies coming under financial distress (Mayer/Alexander,
1990, p. 1). A more recent study (James, 1995) has also found that banks in the
United States make substantial use of equity holdings in financially distressed
firms even though commercial banks are under normal circumstances not entitled
to hold enterprise shares.10
out incurring the cost of monitoring. Enterprises eventually benefit from giving
bankers a say in enterprise affairs because they need to dispose less collateral.
3. Universal versus Separated Banking
( , Both, the dominant role of banks as sources of outside finance as well as
the benefits from designing debt contracts with equity-like components point at
the potential merits of universal banking systems for Eastern Europe. In the al-
ready rather comprehensive literature on the benefits of different financial sys-
tems for the transition economies, universal banking is consequently typically at-
tributed with quite a few positive features. A number of studies finds that univer-
sal banking should be preferred over a system which limits the role of banks to
pure commercial banking activities (Corbett/Mayer, 1991; Frydman/Rapaczynski,
1994; van Wijnbergen, 1992, 1994; Walter/Smith, 1992).
Yet, only a few authors unequivocally advocate the introduction of a full-
blown universal banking system. Steinherr and Gilibert (1994) argue instead that
only privatized banks should operate as universal banks. Dittus and Prowse
(1994) as well as Grosfeld (1994a, 1994b) acknowledge the benefits of a bank-
based financial system but, at the same, time, are skeptical about the applicability
of a universal banking system in the present institutional setting in Eastern
Europe. Thome (1993) essentially advocates a specialized banking system, ar-
guing that commercial banks cannot be expected to exert efficient direct or indi-
rect control over enterprises at the early stages of the transition period. Rather,
corporate governance should be the task of investment banks. In a similar vein,
Rajan (1995) rejects the universal banking option for the emerging market
economies. Phelps et al. (1992) are equally doubtful about the beneficial role of
the existing banks in ensuring effective corporate control as well as about the role
of stock market control. They propose outside control by other, newly emerging
financial intermediaries.
Another group of authors opts for the adoption of a multi-tier banking sys-
tem in which one group of banks (Steinherr/Gilibert, 1994; Szego, 1994) or even
all banks (McKinnon, 1991, 1992) would merely operate as narrow banks. Such
narrow banks would only be allowed to collect deposits from the population and
invest these funds into (safe) government securities. However, banks which invest
into government securities only cannot utilize their potential informational advan-
tage in assessing the quality of loan customers. Hence, an important competitive11
advantage of commercial banks over other financial intermediaries remains un-
utilized in a narrow banking system.^ ..-/.,•
3.1. Advantages of Universal Banking
The major advantage of a universal, bank-based financial system - and
thus the disadvantage of a system of specialized or narrow banks - is the im-
proved utilization of economies of scale and scope in the provision of banking
services (Clark, 1988; Saunders/Walter, 1992). Economies of scale imply that the
average unit costs of a banking product decline as output increases. Economies of
scope arise from complementarities in producing different financial services and
from the shared use of fixed inputs which makes the joint production of financial
services cheaper than their individual provision (Steinherr/Huveneers, 1990, p. 8).
To a certain extent, all commercial banks are exploiting economies of scope be-
cause they simultaneously engage in the loan and in the deposit business. Hence,
information that they obtain from monitoring firms' deposit accounts can be used
to analyze the firms' cash flows and business conditions, thus reducing informa-
tional asymmetries (Nakamura, 1991, 1993). Also, the exploitation of economies
of scale is not a unique advantage of universal banks.
As regards economies of scope, however, universal banks can potentially
make use of a number of further synergy effects.
9 The fact that universal banks
are typically better informed about an enterprise's financial affairs as compared to
pure investment banks may provide a certification effect for the underwriting
business (Puri, 1995). According to this view, it would be less costly for firms to
issue their securities through a universal bank rather than through an investment
house. Furthermore, since the reputation that a bank has build up is an important
asset, universal banks may benefit from offering different types of financial serv-
Van Wijnbergen (1994) argues that the savings banks may be run as narrow banks
in the early stages of the transformation process. This does not seem to destroy in-
formation capital because most liabilities of the savings banks are household de-
posits. At the same time, the savings banks are important sources of liquidity for
the interbank market. Yet, lending on these markets is also risky and would not be
allowed under narrow banking. Hence, applying narrow banking to the savings
banks would potentially lead to a process of financial disintermediation. See
Abel/Skekely (1995) on special issues relating to the reform of the savings banks.
In addition to the effects listed here, universal banks may also benefit from being
able to offer a wider range of products to customers thus better being able to meet
customer demand and from the joint marketing of their products (Saunders/Walter,
1994, p. 230).12
ices, provided that the acquisition of information on the quality of a bank is less
costly for certain types of operations (Rajan, 1995, p. 290).
1
0 :
Even more importantly, universal banks utilize economies of scope be-
tween different types of financing and may thus provide a solution to the corpo-
rate control problem of firms. The dual role of universal banks as debt and equity
holders allows them to impose an optimal control structure on firms.
The theory of optimal corporate control implies that control should shift
from equity holders to debt holders in bad states of the world, i.e. at the lower tail
of the distribution of project returns, in order to maximize the value of the firm.
11
This can be shown in a two-period model in v/hich debt and equity holders are
imperfectly informed about the actions of the firm's management. At the begin-
ning of the first period, control rights are allocated between debt and equity hold-
ers conditional upon a signal that is being observed at the end of this period and
which allows an assessment of managerial effort. In addition, the initial balance
sheet structure is determined. In the first period, management chooses an effort
level, and noisy signals about this effort level are observed by the stakeholders.
They choose either to let the management continue its operations in the second
period or to discontinue activities and to reorganize the firm. If the signal of first-
period performance is below a threshold level, discontinuation of management
activities is optimal. The corresponding optimal incentive scheme of stakeholders
can be implemented by granting control rights to debt holders in bad states of the
world. Because their returns decline with the amount of risk that management as-
sumes (concave returns), debt holders have an incentive to opt for tough inter-
vention policies towards management. Conversely, equity holders which have
convex return streams should be granted control rights in good states of the world
which implies little interference with management action.
The potentially beneficial role of universal banks in the transition econo-
mies thus arises because these banks can be active shareholders during good
In a rather general framework, Canals (1995) shows that the coordination of sev-
eral activities in one bank is superior to the separate provision of these services if
the combined profits exceed the coordination costs plus the additional expenses
from performing the activities independently. Yet, Canals fails to model the spe-
cific feature of universal banking, i.e. the synergies derived from offering both,
debt and equity contracts.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1993, 1994) show that this mechanism holds for the opti-
mal corporate control of a bank. Yet, the essence of the argument applies also to a
non-financial firm.1
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times and active debt holders during bad times (Steinherr/Gilibert, 1994, p. 103).
In this context, two control problems must be distinguished. On the one hand,
dispersed holdings of shares may prevent equity owners to bundle their interests
and to exercise active ownership control. In this situation, banks which hold a
relative small equity stake may assume the role of active owners. On the other
hand, a lack of information on the enterprise affairs and/or a lack of intervention
mechanisms may prevent non-bank debt holders from intervening in the en-
terprise's affairs in bad times. Banks as debt and equity holders may not face
these problems and can thus also behave as active debt holders.
The role of universal banks in reducing informational asymmetries and
agency costs furthermore assigns them a role as sources of long-term finance as
well as in the active restructuring of firms. Long-term contracts that are fully
time-consistent and that do not incorporate incentives to diverge from ex ante
determined specifications when payments fall due are hardly enforceable in the
reform countries. Weak legal systems and great uncertainty over future develop-
ments prevent such contracts from being concluded.
1
2 In this situation, longer-
term contracts can be facilitated through mainbank relationships, where (i) banks
have a dominant share in the credits of an enterprise and are being the first con-
sultants to the enterprise in all financial affairs, (ii) close relationships between
banks and enterprises exist, and (iii) banks have incentives to restructure the en-
terprise (Fischer, 1990, p. 3). While mainbank relationships can, in principle, also
evolve in specialized banking systems, they are yet more likely to emerge in a
universal banking system where banks may hold equity stakes in firms. Hence,
universal banks can be an important source of long-term finance which is urgently
needed to reconfigure the capital stock in the transition economies. The fact that
banks are the largest debt holders in many firms and that they have informational
advantages with respect to their existing clients is underlying the argument by van
Wijnbergen (1994) that banks should be closely involved in the process of enter-
prise restructuring,
13 During such a restructuring process, banks should also be
12 in fact, most bank lending in Eastern Europe is done on a short- to mid-term basis.
At the end of 1994, the share of long-term lending in total loans was only 21.6 per-
cent in Hungary, followed by the Czech Republic (29.2 percent), and Poland (36.3
percent) (Buch, 1996).
13 Bear and Gray (1994, p. 11) take a different view regarding the information that
banks have on their traditional clients. They argue that the poor state of the ac-
counting systems in Eastern Europe does not allow an evaluation even of the exist-
ing firms. Yet, this argument neglects that the relevant information set contains
elements other than accounting data. On further components such as the organiza-14
allowed to swap old debt into equity in order to create incentives for this in-
volvement.^
Implementing universal banking systems can furthermore contribute to in-
creased competition in the domestic banking system, in particular regarding the
market entry of foreign banks. In view of the global trend towards a liberalization
of financial markets and the introduction of universal banking, it hardly seems
conceivable that the Eastern European economies could choose to entirely restrict
universal banking activities. Such restrictions would have negative implications
for the market entry of foreign banks which are likely to prefer to offer the same
range of financial services to their clients abroad that they can offer in their home
countries.
3.2. Risks of Universal Banking
The advantages of a universal banking system in providing a solution to the
corporate control problem of firms and in helping to restructure firms must be
weighted against its potential risks and disadvantages. First of all, universal
banking entails risks for the stability of the financial systems.
1
5 Universal banks
can be debt and equity holders of an enterprise at the same time. The resulting in-
creased exposure to systematic risks may not be reflected adequately in tradi-
tional risk measures which disregard correlations between the rates of returns of
different assets (Steinherr/Gilibert, 1994). This argument receives additional
weight in view of the fact that deposit insurance schemes in the countries under
review have during most of the reform process taken the form of implicit state
guarantees. Only recently has deposit insurance been put on a more explicit basis,
yet failing to account for banking risks in the calculation of insurance premia and
leaving major state-owned banks under the umbrella of full government protec-
tion (Buch, 1996). Hence, the negative impact that moral hazard has on the safety
tional structure and potential competitive advantages of firms, banks may well have
superior information as compared to other agents.
'4 Yet, equity holdings of banks in firms are not a necessary condition for bank-led
loan work-outs. Loan work-outs by commercial banks will also occur if banks can
impose a bankruptcy threat on firms (Nakamura, 1989).
5 It could also be conceivable that universal banks are less risky than specialized
banks because of benefits that they can derive from assembling more diversified
portfolios (Saunders/Walter, 1994, pp. 230). Yet, using the above argument on
economies of scope between debt and equity contracts in one firm as the underly-
ing rationale for universal banking activities, risk concentration is likely to be
higher in universal than in specialized banks.15
net of the banking system may even be exacerbated under universal banking
(Saunders/Walter, 1994).
In addition, universal banks are exposed to substantial conflicts of interest
that arise from simultaneously taking deposits from non-commercial customers,
from granting credit to, and being equity owners of an enterprise. As board mem-
bers of enterprises, bankers obtain insider information on planned investment
projects and on other relevant business decisions. There are several ways of ex-
ploiting this insider information to the disadvantage of the bank's depositors. The
bank may, for example, decide to invest deposits into enterprise shares even
though depositors may prefer safer investments. In order to maintain the value of
their existing shareholdings, banks may also grant new loans to troubled firms,
adding an additional layer to the distress lending phenomenon.
1
6 Incidentally, the
fear that universal banks may fool investors by selling shares of firms which could
not service their debt was one main justification for the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933 which prohibits universal banking in the United States (Rajan, 1995). Fol-
lowing such a strategy, the bank could use the sales proceeds to recover the lost
loan. Of course, such a strategy can only be rational if the bank has a compara-
tively short time horizon which, in any case, is not an unreasonable assumption in
the Eastern European setting.
In order to prevent such conflicts of interest from occurring, it is therefore
essential to maintain clear institutionalized divisions between investment and
commercial banking activities.
1
7 Choosing a subsidiary form of a universal
banking system would have the additional advantage of easing the supervision of
banks as well as the calculation of deposit insurance premia since risks could be
separated (Saunders/Walter, 1994, pp. 234). Yet, in the Eastern European setting
where trained personnel is scarce and where reputational mechanisms are yet
fragile, such division rules are even more likely to be ignored than in developed
market economies. Furthermore, the system must still be flexible enough as to
allow an exchange of information between the departments such that economies
of scope can actually be utilized. All this requires a comparatively complex and
efficient internal organizational structure of the banks which, again, may not be
realized in Eastern Europe.
See Perotti (1993) for a discussion of the distress lending phenomenon under pure
debt contracts.
One way to promote the maintenance of such fire walls is to adopt a British-type of
universal banking system where the investment and commercial banking depart-
ments are separately incorporated (Steinherr/Huveneers, 1994, p. 273).16
In addition, the argument that universal banks can contribute to the evolu-
tion of beneficial mainbank relationships must be substantially modified for the
situation of the Eastern European reform countries. In the immediate aftermath of
banking system reform when banking regulations were weak and could hardly be
enforced, a large number of new banks has been licensed. Many of these banks
were founded by firms which hoped to obtain low-interest loans from the banks.
Substantial interlocking ownership of banks and enterprises has been the result.
These close relations between banks and enterprises are certainly not of the type
needed to allow for efficient long-term commitments. In fact, Bennett (1995)
points out that allowing enterprises to control banks would be the wrong way to
introduce universal banking. Hence, such inefficient ,,mainbank" relationships
should be exposed to substantial competitive pressure. Banks which are merely
the finance departments of large enterprises and which do not comply with pru-
dential regulations must be exposed to a bankruptcy threat. Universal banking
may also entail the risk of new, inefficient mainbank relationships to emerge
(Rajan, 1995) because it makes firms dependent on their ,,Hausbank" as the main
source of finance. This risk is a particular concern in the emerging market
economies because of the lack of competition in financial markets. Hence, market
entry into the banking industry should be rather liberal in order to provide firms
with a wide range of choices for their banking relations. This holds especially
with respect to the market entry of more efficient, foreign banks
The potential for bad mainbank relationships to evolve in Eastern Europe
points at another risk that is inherent to universal banking in these economies.
While universal banking may solve the agency problems of firms, corporate con-
trol issues within banks remain unresolved.
1^ Yet, neither the successor banks of
the monobank nor many newly founded private banks can a priori be expected to
operate as profit maximizing lending institutions due to their close ties to political
circles and enterprises, respectively. Hence, imposing an corporate control on
(universal) banks is of key importance. Only if this goal is achieved can universal
banks be expected to contribute to a more efficient allocation and utilization of fi-
nancial resources.
See Udell/Wachtel (1995) for an analysis of the variety of principal agent relation-
ships which can be observed in a banking firm.17
Ultimately, the privatization of banks will contribute to the improved cor-
porate governance of banks.
1
9 This holds in particular to the extent that privati-
zation contributes to the emergence of a dominant shareholder such as a foreign
bank. Since the privatization of banks is typically postponed in the transition
economies,
2
0 the government must assume certain control functions in the yet
state-owned banks. Setting a clear time table for the privatization of banks and
enhancing the incentives of bank managers to successfully prepare the banks for
privatization can ameliorate the behavior of banks in the pre-privatization phase.
The incentives of bankers can, for example, be improved through the commer-
cialization of banks, the establishment of supervisory boards, and the issuance of
stock options to be exercised by bank management upon privatization.
In addition, because the privatization of banks may not even be a sufficient
condition for changing management incentives (van Wijnbergen, 1994), banking
supervision should have been sufficiently tightened prior to privatization. Other-
wise, risky lending and the eventual insolvency of banks may put pressure on the
government to bail-out privatized banks, thus seriously undermining its credibility
not to grant subsidies to the private sector.
2
1 Upon strengthening banking super-
vision, deposit insurance should furthermore be put on an explicit basis. While a
fully privately run deposit insurance system may hardly be credible in view of the
inherited system of full state guarantees for the state-owned banks, clear partici-
pation rules for such a system should be established, and state guarantees should
increasingly be withdrawn. This implies that only a certain minimum amount of
deposits should be insured, that only banks which fulfill minimum standards of
prudence and solvency should be granted access to a deposit insurance system,
and that whenever possible deposit insurance fees should be linked to the riski-
ness of the underlying assets.
2
2
19 Of course, also private owners of a bank have to ensure that the interests of man-
agers are aligned with their own goals. In this context, see John/Saunders/Senbet
(1995) for a discussion of optimal incentive schemes for bank managers.
20 While the Czech Republic has moved earliest in this context by including the ma-
jor state-owned banks in the voucher privatization scheme, the state retains sub-
stantial control rights (see also Table 8, Appendix). It is the intention of the Czech
government to sell these shares to strategic investors. Poland and Hungary, instead,
rely on the direct sales method for the privatization of their banks. Yet, delays in
the implementation of bank recapitalization programs have substantially held back
the privatization of the banks in these countries (Buch, 1996). See Bonin (1995)
for an overview of bank privatization strategies in Eastern Europe.
21 See Buch (1994) for an analysis of policies to deal with the bad debt problem.
22 See Saunders and Walter (1995) for an overview of issues relating to the regulation
of universal banks.18
Leaving the problem of imposing an effective system of corporate control
on universal banks aside, Dittus and Provvse (1994, p. 14) as well as Grosfeld
(1994a, p. 4) argue furthermore that universal banks may not be suited to restruc-
ture enterprises efficiently and to prepare firms for operations in new markets.
They claim that a bank-based financial system works best in industries where
standard operating procedures and skills must be evaluated. Market-based finan-
cial systems, in contrast, have comparative advantages in evaluating new and
risky industries. A bank-based system which introduces strong links between
banks and enterprises in Eastern Europe may thus hinder competition and may
fail to give firms incentives to search for new investment opportunities. Yet, this
argument does not provide a justification for an outright prohibition of universal
banking operations. First, it is not evident which type of decisions would actually
be more relevant for the transition economies. While some product innovation
will certainly have to take place, substantial room for adjustments in the standard
operations of firms also remains. Second, instead of prohibiting universal banking
operations, the implementation of flexible regulatory systems which allow the ac-
cess of firms to a wide array of financial instruments seems a more promising
strategy to adopt. While new, risky firms may obtain their financing through ven-
ture capital funds or through retained earnings, better established firms may find it
less costly to obtain bank loans.
3.3. Conclusions
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is that
the introduction of a universal banking system benefits the transition economies
because it can promote the provision of long-term finance, because it reduces
problems of corporate control in firms, and because it may create large stake-
holders which have an incentive to restructure firms. Yet, the risks of a universal
banking system must be considered as well. These risks primarily stem from the
fact that incentive systems within banks are still rather weak. Bank privatization,
the strengthening of banking supervision, and the abolition of implicit deposit in-
surance systems can improve bank performance. Eventually, the emerging market
economies can also exploit positive spill-over effects between bank-based and
market-based financial structures because the evolution of stock markets may
contribute to the needed corporate governance mechanisms for banks. Hence,
there is a possible trade-off between stock market development and the evolution
of an efficient (universal) banking system (Phelps et al, 1992).19
Currently, the economies in transition are lacking important pieces of the,
infrastructure needed for the effective implementation of a bank-based as well as
of a market-based financial system. Hence, the main task of the reformers is to
create an institutional framework that (i) does not hamper the evolution of either
system, depending on the needs of the economy and on the privatization method
that has been chosen, and that (ii) introduces safeguards against the misuse of any
system. The first requirement implies that the creation of a strong legal back-
ground for the operation of financial markets as well as of reliable information
systems should be assigned high priority already at the beginning of the transfor-
mation process. In other words, the mere withdrawal of the state from the control
of state-owned bahks and the evolution of any kind of financial market structure
from scratch is unlikely to yield optimal results (Frydman/Rapaczynski, 1994,
p. 57). Instead, the state has a role to play in setting the determinants of the insti-
tutional frameworks of financial markets while it should not interfere with the
actual decision making processes within banks.
Commercial banks in transition economies should generally be allowed to
perform investment banking activities and to hold limited amounts of equity in
firms. Incidentally, not the actual amount of equity that banks hold in firms is de-
cisive but the fact that they do hold shares and thus represent shareholders' inter-
ests (Saunders, 1994, p. 238). At the same time, a proper regulation of banks and
the maintenance of the stability of the banks' safety net require that (i) threshold
levels and full provisioning requirements for equity holdings must be introduced,
that (ii) banks are being monitored by a supervisory agency, and that (iii) they are
being exposed to effective systems of corporate governance and control. As long
as basic compliance with these requirements cannot be ensured and if automatic
deposit insurance is still in place, equity holdings of banks in enterprises should
be strictly limited and may even be forbidden.
2
3 This holds in particular for the
large, state-owned banks as long as these are subjected to substantial influence
from the political arena.
As regards the reforms that are needed in order to ensure an improved flow
of funds to new, private enterprises, universal banking operations in the sense de-
fined above are not necessarily required.
2
4 Instead, institutional reforms which
23 Note that this restriction does not apply to other investment banking activities.
24 in the long-run, however, universal banking may benefit even the newly emerging
firms because universal banks have the potential to accompany enterprises through
all stages of financing, including the issuance of equity shares at later stages of the20
allow for an improved performance of banks in their traditional lending activities
are needed. These reforms comprise the enhancement of the legal framework for
the provision of collateral, the clarification of ownership rights as well as im-
provements in information and accounting systems. State-owned investment
banks as well as government guarantees for loans to small enterprises may appear
as another solution to the problem that positive effects of lending to small firms
may not be taken into consideration by competitive private banks. Yet, for such
institutional arrangements to be successful, substantial credibility of the govern-
ment not to base lending decisions on political considerations, and to implement
proper credit screening mechanisms is needed. Since these conditions are hardly
met in the transition economies, preferential loan facilities should only be envis-
aged if foreign-based financial institutions can be involved in such programs.
4. Evidence from Developed and Developing Countries
The experience of developed and developing countries can provide useful
insights into the likely effects that financial sector reforms in Eastern Europe may
have. TJtiese data show, first of all, that new equity issues play a comparatively
small role in the financing of enterprises in established market economies
(Table 2) (Stiglitz, 1991, 1992; Mayer, 1987). In Germany, for example, enter-
prises received only 8.2 percent of their new financing from new equity issues in
the 1982-1988 period. Instead, retained earnings accounted for the bulk of fi-
nance (89.6 percent). In the United Kingdom, new equity has been somewhat
more important (14.3 percent) while retained earnings accounted for 58.2 percent
of the financial funds of firms. Here, debt finance (27.3 percent) and in particular
trade credit (18.5 percent) were far more important than in Germany. Long-range
time series for the United States show a declining reliance on equity finance and
an increased role of debt finance in the post-war period. Interestingly, the issu-'
ance of new shares, which in the first half of the century accounted for 15 percent
of new finance, was only of small importance for the financing of firms in the
United States in the post-war period (Singh/Hamid, 1992, p. 10).
firm's life cycle. Yet, this potential advantage of universal banks is not necessarily
a factor behind the initial access to external funding in Eastern Europe.21






















































Germany and UK: 1982-1988 averages; Korea: 1980-1987; Mexico: 1984-
1988. Turkey: 1982-1987.
Sources: Mayer/Alexander (1990, p. 10); Singh/Hamid (1992, p. 11, p. 44).
Singh and Hamid furthermore collected data on the financial structure of
firms in developing countries in the 1980s. The most important difference bet-
ween the financing patterns of these and of developed countries is the high share
of new equity, ranging from 40.3 percent in Korea to 76.0 percent in Mexico.
Retained earnings, in contrast, play a comparatively small role while the share of
debt finance varies across countries. It will thus be interesting to see whether the
financial structure of firms in transition economies follows the pattern of devel-
oped market economies or rather those of the recent history of less developed
countries.
Yet, even if the financial structure of firms in the emerging market econo-
mies would converge to a pattern similar to that observed in developed market
economies, this does not necessarily imply similar efficiency in the allocation of
financial recourses. Heavy reliance on internally generated funds in the absence
of product market competition and of a lack of efficient managers may well imply
continued resource misallocation (EBRD, 1995, p. 92). The promotion of access
to external finance - together with the implied improvements in the corporate
governance of firms - as well as enhanced product market competition are thus
means to facilitate a better allocation of resources.
As regards the performance of different types of financial systems, a com-
prehensive review of the literature would certainly be beyond the scope of this22
paper. Recently, Prowse (1995) has provided an overview of corporate control
mechanisms in Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. He
finds that the system of corporate control that evolves in a particular country is
strongly influenced by the regulatory and legal structure of that economy. This
structure," in turn, is determined through regulations for insider trading, for finan-
cial disclosure, and through the corporate law which has an impact on the possi-
bilities of firms to raise outside finance. The main result of his survey is that the
German and the Japanese financial systems allow banks to perform control func-
tions in enterprises at relatively low costs while at the same time firms have only
limited options to raise non-bank debt finance.
2
5 The financial systems'of the
United States and the United Kingdom, in contrast, prevent banks from control-
ling firms in normal times through equity holdings while relying more on (costly)
takeovers to control firms. In essence, the main conclusion Prowse draws (p. 55)
is that each of these countries would benefit from allowing market forces to play
a greater role in the coiporate governance of firms. Hence, his findings confirm
the conclusion that had tentatively been suggested above, namely that the transi-
tion economies should eliminate regulatory barriers to the functioning of either
system of corporate control and instead let an optimal financial structure emerge
endpgenously while, at the same time, controlling for risks that certain structures
would imply.
Furthermore, a number of studies has sought to analyze the relevance of
economies of scale and scope in banking.
2
6 Thus far, the evidence is still incon-
clusive with respect to the existence of economies of scale in banking (Saunders,
1994, pp. 232). Steinherr (1995) analyzes the profitability of 88 banks in 18
countries over the 1985/86-1990 period. He concludes that universal banks tend
to achieve a better risk-return trade-off than specialized banks which he explains
with a possible positive correlation between the size of a bank and its monitoring
capacities as well as with the informational advantage of universal banks. He,
however, fails to detect significant economies of scale or scope in the banks
studied. Yet, Hughes et al. (1995) point out that the inability of empirical studies
to detect economies of scale may be due to the fact that these models assume risk
neutrality on part of bank management. Hence, cost advantages that result from
A reference needs to be made in this context to the study of Edwards and Fischer
(1994) who find - due to a lack of micro-data - little solid evidence for the notion
that proxy votings of German universal banks as well as the board membership of
bankers have significant influence on the corporate governance of large German
firms.
Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) give an overview of the empirical evidence.23
an improved control of risk as the bank increases in size are not considered in
these models. By allowing for risk aversion of bank management, Hughes et al.
find that economies of scale exist, and that these increase with the size of the
banking firm. ..-, :
As regards the evidence on the existence of economies of scope in bank-
ing, reliable results are even more difficult to obtain (Rajan, 1995, p. 291). This
holds in particular because an empirical investigation into the ability of universal
banks to solve agency problems would require the availability of microeconomic
evidence on loan contract terms, corporate control structures, the duration of
creditor relations, and on loan restructuring cases. Furthermore, such data should
be comparable across countries in order to allow for comparisons of different
corporate control structures. Generally, Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993)
find that the joint production of banking products creates some economies of
scope. Saunders and Walter (1994) perform cost functions tests for the period
1981-1986, finding - if anything - (cost) diseconomies of scope between interest
and non-interest earning financial services. They explain this result with the heavy
investment that banks have made during this period into expanding their range of
services (p. 81). It thus remains to be seen whether these investments will even-
tually lead to the exploitation of positive economies of scope later on.
With respect to the potential informational advantage that universal banks
have over other financial intermediaries in being creditors and security underwrit-
ers of a firm at the same time, two recent studies have analyzed the pre-Glass-
Steagall experience of the United States. Puri (1995) finds that bank-underwritten
securities generated higher prices that similar investment banking underwritings,
thus reflecting lower ex ante risk. This dominance of a certification effect over
conflicts of interest as perceived by investors is particularly pronounced for in-
formation-sensitive and junior securities. Hence, banks may actually be utilizing
economies of scope in this market segment. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) perform
an ex post analysis of security returns. According to their study for the years
1921-1929, bank affiliates typically underwrote better performing securities than
specialized investment banks. Again, this finding points at the utilization of
economies of scope through universal banks.
Not only the emergence of more efficient systems of corporate governance
but also the provision of outside finance to new, private firms is a key goal of re-
forms. While better corporate governance systems may be facilitated through uni-
versal banking-type institutional structures, lending to new, private firms does not24
require universal banking to be permitted. While close creditor-debtor relations
are certainly promoting private enterprise financing, these must not necessarily be
facilitated through ownership stakes of banks in firms. Berger and Udell (1994b)
rather find that access to bank lending for private firms is a function of the size of
the banks. While the administration of a large number of small enterprise ac-
counts may be associated with managerial diseconomies for large banks, small
banks often fill this market niche. In a related paper (Berger/Udeli, 1994a), the
authors find that borrowers with a longer-term business relationship with a bank
tend to pay lower interest rates and to pledge less collateral than those borrowers
which do not have these well-established contacts. Incidentally, this analysis sup-
ports the argument by Fischer (1990) that the evolution of mainbank relationships
can have positive implications for firms' access to external finance.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EASTERN EUROPE27
The discussion so far has shown that banks are likely to play an important
role in the financing of new, private enterprises as well as in providing a solution
to the corporate control problem for large, state-owned firms during the privati-
zation process. Universal banks have comparative advantages over specialized fi-
nancial institutions in performing particularly the latter task. Yet, enhancing the
efficiency of the financial systems in the transition economies is not only a func-
tion of the ability of banks to operate as universal banks. Instead, important legal
and institutional reforms are needed in order to promote a more efficient alloca-
tion of financial resources. This chapter proceeds by analyzing the potential and
actual involvement of banks in Eastern Europe in enterprise restructuring, the le-
gal framework for the access to outside finance for firms, and it presents indica-
tors-of financial markets structures. ,
1. The Relationship of Banks and Firms
All three countries under reviewhave already opted for some form of uni-
versal banking system. Yet, the different roles that are being assigned to banks
and the channels through which banks may get engaged in the process of enter-
prise restructuring are far from being uniform.28
All legal regulations that this chapter refers to are summarized in Table 8
(Appendix).
The information that will be presented in the following has been taken from the
"Act on Banks" for the Czech Republic (SBC, 1992; Trade Links, 1995a, 1995b),25
1.1. Universal Banking
In the Czech Republic, banks can generally perform commercial and in-
vestment banking activities at the same time. Yet, banks' equity holdings in en-
terprises are restricted. These holdings need to be notified and approved by the
Czech National Bank if they exceed 10 percent of the firm's capital or if the sum
of all equity holdings exceeds 25 percent of the bank's capital. Temporary hold-
ings of equity may be higher, and the limitations to not apply to those equity
stakes which were acquired through debt-to-equity swaps or to equity stakes
which are held on behalf of third parties.
2
9 Through debt-to-equity swaps, the
Consolidation Bank which was founded in 1991 to take over presumably non-
performing loans from the commercial banks could actually acquire substantial
ownership stakes in enterprises (Brom/Orenstein, 1994).3O Overall, equity par-
ticipations still represent only a modest fraction of the assets of Czech banks, al-
though their importance increased only between January and December 1994
from 0.4 to 1.2 percent of total assets (CNB, 1995).
3
1
As in the Czech case, Polish banks can perform commercial and invest-
ment banking activities at the same time, and non-bank financial institutions can
engage in commercial banking activities upon approval of the National Bank.
Generally, banks cannot hold more than 25 percent of their assets in shares within
one company. Yet, holdings of up to 50 percent are permissible upon approval of
the National Bank.
In Hungary, bank involvement in the process of enterprise restructuring has
been less favorably treated by regulations than in the Czech Republic and in Po-
land. Commercial banks have to set up fully-owned affiliates in order to perform
investment banking activities, and debt restructuring through banks has until re-
from the "Act on Financial Institutions" for Hungary (SBS, 1994), and from the
"Banking Act" of 1989, amended in 1992 (NBP, 1989; Kostro, 1992) for Poland.
See also Table 8 in the Appendix.
29 Bonds which were issued to increase the capital of banks in the context of the bank
recapitalization of 1991 carry no interest coupons but are to be swapped into shares
in privatized companies after five years (IMF, 1994, p. 131).
30 Currently, the bank occupies about 11 percent of the loan market in the Czech Re-
public (Buch, 1996).
31 This value is actually not too far away from the share of equity and participations
in the German banking system. Here, this asset item accounted for about 1.9 per-
cent of assets between 1983 and 1992, while displaying an increasing trend over
the sample period (OECD, 1994b).26
cently not been encouraged. Besides the organizational separation between in-
vestment and commercial banking activities, some large exposure limitations ex-
ist. First, loans cannot be provided for obtaining ownership stakes in an enterprise
if the bank has influential participations in that ilrrn.32 Second, commercial banks
cannot hold more than 15 percent of their capital in stakes in one enterprise; a 40
percent limit on these holdings applies to investment banks. Third, the sum of
ownership stakes in enterprises cannot exceed 60 percent of the bank's capital
but shareholdings from debt-to-equity swaps are unlimited for 6 months (3 years
if acquired in conciliation agreements) (Bonin/Schaffer, 1994, p. 23). Yet, hold-
ings of shares and of other share-like securities have thus far remained of minor
importance. In relation to the total assets of the Hungarian banking system, share-
holdings increased from 0.08 to 0.29 percent between 1991 and 1993. Also in
relation to loans to customers, shareholdings do not reach more'than 1 percent.
3
3
As. the EBRD notes (1995, p. 131), banks and investment funds in Hungary do
thus not play a role as outside owners of firms.
One way to measure the importance of investment banking activities in the
operations of commercial banks is to look at the share of non-interest income in
total income or relative to total assets. Yet, evidence from developed countries
shows that this measure by itself cannot be taken as a clear indicator of the impor-
tance of universal banking activities. In the United States with its separated
banking system, for example, non-interest income accounted for about
30.8 percent of total income of commercial banks in the 1983-1992 period while
it contributed virtually the same amount (30.4 percent) to the income of German
(universal) banks (OECD, 1994b).
Table 3 reveals that non-interest income has followed a quite unstable pat-
tern in the Czech Republic and in Hungary while it doubled in importance be-
tween 1991 and 1992 in Poland. Here, it retained a constant share afterwards.
Incidentally, the share of non-interest income in total income was similar in 1994
in Hungary and in Poland as in Germany or in the United States with roughly
25-30 percent while it was only half as important in the Czech Republic
(It! 9 percent). Yet, these data are potentially misleading for two reasons. First,
accounting standards in Eastern Europe underwent substantial changes during the
32 Influential participation is being defined as direct or indirect ownership exceeding
10 percent of the voting rights or as the bank having significant influence on the
firm's business decision.
33 These numbers were calculated on the basis of internal documents of the Kiel Insti-
tute of World Economics.27
sample period. Hence, comparability of the data over time is most likely not en-
sured. Second, only net data are being reported. In view of the substantial invest-
ments into the banking infrastructure that are needed in Eastern Europe and that
show up as non-interest expenses, gross income and revenue data as well as a
further disaggregation of the data would be needed in order to assess the expan-
sion of banks into investment banking activities.


































(excluding the Consolidation Bank);









Sources: Various annual reports of Czech commercial banks and of the CNB;
Golajewska/Wyczanski (1994), Wyczanski (1995); unpublished mate-
rial of the National Bank of Hungary.
1.2. Bank Involvement in Enterprise Restructuring
When assessing the role of banks in enterprise restructuring, one must, first
of all, note that evidence on restructuring activities is generally scarce. The Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 1995, p. 128) reports
evidence from unpublished enterprise surveys which sheds some light on these is-
sues. Thus far, restructuring tends to have taken place in all firms, regardless of
ownership structure as a response to a hardening of budget constraints. If any-
thing, active restructuring appears to have taken place primarily in firms with a
foreign outside owner and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in bank - or investment
fund - controlled firms. As regards the firms that have been privatized already, no
statistically significant changes in adjustment patterns can be identified as yet. At
the same time, these findings imply that countries benefit from reforms which as-28
sign a potentially important role to individual institutions or investors to perform
governance functions.
Czech Republic
One example for such a strategy is the Czech Republic. In addition to eq-
uity stakes that banks directly hold in enterprises, the involvement of Czech
banks in the creation of investment funds has led to control of banks over firms.
In the context of the Czech voucher privatization program, each adult received a
booklet with voucher points which he could use to bid for shares of enterprises.
Since 1992, investment funds have emerged which collected the voucher points
and invested these into firms (Graph 1) (Brom/Orenstein, 1994, p. 904). Through
their ownership of investment companies,34 banks have set up their own invest-
ment funds. The original voucher owners become owners of the privatization
funds but have in fact little control over the investment companies which run the
funds (Frensch, 1994, p. 46). Although over 300 investment companies were
originally founded, only about 50 of them play a significant role in the corporate
governance of firms through their board membership in privatized firms. Further-
more, 7 out of the largest 10 investment funds are owned and controlled by banks
(Boniri;1995,p.40).
Contrary to earlier fears, mass privatization in the Czech Republic has not
led to widespread dispersed ownership structures. Instead, in the first pri-
vatization round, investment funds acquired 66.2 percent of the total book value
of Czech enterprises, and 75 percent of the privatized firms had concentrated
ownership of investment funds of at least 30 percent (Matesova/Seda, 1994,
p. 39, p. 50). Because bank-controlled investment funds collected about
60 percent of the voucher points of all investment funds in the first privatization
wave - this share having gone down somewhat in the second wave (Mejstrik,
1994, p. 21) - banks thus potentially play an important role in the corporate go-
vernance of firms.35
The success of banks with collecting voucher points is primarily due to the
fact that they had a branch network at hand, that they could cover advertising
Since the second wave of the voucher privatization program, the funds can manage
themselves and need not necessarily have an investment company.
Furthermore, the government has retained a large potential governance role in
banks and enterprises through the board seats held by its National Property Fund
(Brom/Orenstein, 1994).29
costs of the funds, and that they had a fairly good reputation for soundness and
reliability (Coffee, 1994, p. 12). To what extent banks use their power to improve
the performance of Czech enterprises and thus to contribute to the success of the
privatization process cannot be evaluated finally. Generally, IPFs tend to have
maintained their liquidity, adopted a long-term view of the enterprises' affairs,
and are being engaged in firm restructuring (Brom/Orenstein, 1994).
3
6 Also, IPFs
tend to gain effective control in the enterprises in which they invest (EBRD,
1995, p. 130). Yet, bank- and non-bank controlled IPFs may still behave differ-
ently. One further piece of evidence that is thus far available is that non-bank
controlled, private investment funds have assembled more concentrated portfo-
lios, allowing them to retain greater control rights while bank-controlled funds
have more dispersed portfolios (Coffee, 1994, p. 4). This dispersion of shares
would tend to reduce the potential impact of banks on firms. Generally, the share
holdings of the funds (or of a group of funds) in one firm are restricted to a maxi-
mum of 20 percent of the shares of the firm and/or to a maximum of 10 percent of
the capital of the fund. These restrictions tend to limit the effective control that
investment funds can have over enterprises.
Graph 1 — Structure of the Czech Investment Funds.
Banks
own IC's X. I pay fee
^Investment Companies (IC)J
manage and control ^ pay fee
Investment Privatization Funds (IPF)
pay dividends
Generally, Czech banks have financial incentives to exercise effective
control rights in firms, because they earn the fees from the privatization funds
(Edwards, 1994, p. 30). In addition, Czech banks send representatives to the ex-
ecutive and supervisory boards of firms. The funds are thus similar to core in-
vestors. Furthermore, bank-owned investment funds may be less liquidity con-
36 However, restructuring efforts appear not to be of much difference in IPF-
controlled firms as opposed to other outsider-controlled enterprises (EBRD, 1995,
p. 133).30
straint than independent investment funds because they can, at least for a certain
period of time, cross-subsidize losses of the funds through other banking profits.
According to this view, banks would thus take a more long-term view of the en-
terprise's affairs rather than maximizing short-run cash flow (Brom/Orenstein,
1994, p. 913).
However, the role of Czech banks in the effective control of firms is lim-
ited to the extent that qualified personnel is scarce and that conflicts of interest
arise between the investment fund management and the commercial banking op-
erations. Often, bank managers are send to fill board seats. These managers have
incentives to recover as much as possible for their loan business -oand thus to
charge high interest rates - rather than to opt for high dividends or for profits to
be reinvested (Matesova/Seda, 1994, p. 1.9). Coffee (1994, pp. 32) provides
mixed evidence with regard to the exchange of information between the com-
mercial and investment banking activities. While some banks actively exchange
information between these departments, others have established fire walls, trying
to evade possible conflicts of interest. Czech banks can in principle be required
also by law to establish Chinese walls between their investment and commercial
banking activities, but such requirements seem to be difficult to implement. A
further potential hindrance to the efficiency of bank control is the degree of cross-
ownership in the banking system through investment funds. Although banks can
officially not buy shares of other banks, this restriction could be circumvent by
founding fully-owned investment funds. Through this channel, banks hold up to
25 percent of the shares in each other (Mejstrik, 1994).
Poland
In Poland, banks are assigned a comparatively strong role in the execution
of the Law on the Restructuring of Banks and Enterprises which has come into
force in March 1993 (Pawlowicz, 1994a, 1994b, 1995). Besides providing the le-
gal background for the recapitalization of the state-owned commercial banks, this
law assigns a role to banks in leading and organizing debt restructuring cases.
Loans which are being dealt with under the regulations of this law must be trans-
ferred to a special loan work-out unit within the bank. New lending to the af-
fected firms must temporarily be suspended.
Under the new law, banks have in principle four options to deal with a loan
that has turned out non-performing (Kawalec et al, 1994):31
1. If the debt owed to the bank exceeds 10 percent of the total liabilities of the
firm and 1 billion Zloty or if it exceeds 20 percent of the firm's debt, a bank-
led conciliation process can be started. This method can also be applied by
banks other than those benefiting from recapitalization between 1993 and 1996
in the cases of those firms which are at least 50 percent state-owned. The
bank-led conciliation procedure is the main innovative part of the program. It
strengthens the role of large creditors - which in most cases are the banks -
because it allows decisions to be made by simple majority rule (Belka. 1994, p.
76). The Polish government as one major creditor in most firms announced that
it would proportionally meet any debt reductions agreed upon by other credi-
tors (van Wijnbergen, 1994, p. 10). Companies which apply for banks to initi-
ate a bank-led conciliation procedure had to submit a financial and3a restructur-
ing plan by the end of March 1994; this deadline had been extended to Sep-
tember 1994 for the Savings and for the Agricultural Bank which were in-
cluded in the program at a later stage.
2. A regular bankruptcy procedure can be started (court-led conciliation).
3. The firm can be liquidated.
4. The bank can sell the debt of the enterprise on the market. Generally, debt buy
backs of enterprises are possible. ••:,
Generally, debt-to-equity swaps are one possible outcome of the bank-led
conciliation procedures. Such swaps would incidentally increase the corporate
governance role of banks in enterprises. Yet, Polish tax laws currently rather dis-
courage debt-to-equity swaps. Prior to a debt conversion, provisions that had
been made for the loans in question must be dissolved, and are subjected to
regular taxation. Afterwards, new after-tax provisions must be made by the full
amount of the equity stake. As a consequence, first results of the debt restructur-
ing programs indicate that banks swapped debt into equity in less than one per-
cent of the cases (Table 4). Reportedly, however, many more debt-tb-equity
swaps were originally envisaged, but they did not come into force because of the
tax disincentives as well as of lengthy bargaining procedures with government
agencies which have to approve the conversions. As a consequence, ownership of
firms by investment funds or banks is thus far of marginal importance in the case
of Poland (EBRD, 1995, p. 131).
The Polish Ministry of Finance collected data oh the results of the restruc-
turing program until April 1994. According to this source, conciliation procedures
had been initiated by March 1994 in 25.5 percent of all cases, accounting for
53 percent of the credit volume (Table 4). Hence, conciliation procedures were32
chosen for debtors of above-average size where banks could expect their efforts
to pay off. Consequently, debt sales were chosen in 12.1 percent of the cases, ac-
counting for only 1 percent, of the loan volume.











































































Sources: Kawalec at al. (1994); Wyczanski (1995); unpublished data of the
;;;;, National Bank of Poland and of the Polish Ministry of Finance.
While the data of the Ministry of Finance only covers seven banks, more
recent data for all banks were collected by the National Bank of Poland. Out of
the total loan volume involved, 23.7 percent had been submitted by the nine
commercialized banks, the Agricultural Bank (BGZ) alone accounting for a fur-
ther 50 percent. Altogether half of all irregular loans were included in the pro-
gram. By December 1994, the most important restructuring method (31.3 percent)
was the bank conciliation procedure. Banks made thus use of the strengthened
position that was assigned to them. This trend has been more pronounced for the
nine banks than for the rest of the banking system. Both, debt sales and liquida-
tions - and thus relatively passive strategies - had become more important than at
the early stage of the program. Unspecified items account for about one fourth of
total.loan volume. One explanation for this high share is that loans in this cate-
gory were transferred to the state-owned Intervention Fund which engages in33
centralized debt restructuring. With regard to the actual involvement of banks in
the restructuring of firms, only anecdotal evidence is available. While banks haye
developed strategies for improving their own monitoring techniques, they seem to
have been relatively inactive with regard to the real restructuring of firms. If any-
thing,, they tended to carry on with the plans which had already been developed
by enterprise management. The main impact that banks exerted on firms was to
deny access to new credit.
Also in Poland, banks may assume a corporate governance role through
their management of investment funds (Bartkiewicz/Bledowski, 1995). In contrast
to the Czech case, Polish investment funds did not arise spontaneously but were
rather created by the government. 15 National Investment Funds were founded on
the basis of the Mass Privatization Act of April 1993. These funds received
60 percent of the shares of companies to be privatized, the remaining shares being
earmarked for the employees and for the state. The allocation of the shares of the
413 enterprises to the investment funds is done in separate selection rounds which
ensures concentration of the shares in a ,,lead" fund (EBRD, 1995, p. 137).
Banks play a role in this process because they own shares in the management
companies of the investment funds. Each Polish citizen has the option to purchase
share certificates. These certificates, in turn,;can be exchanged for shares in the
investment funds. Yet, 15 percent of the investment fund shares will be retained
for future remuneration of the management companies in form of a fee. Experi-
ence with the mass privatization program, which covers 7.8 percent of Polish en-
terprises in terms of sales, is not yet available. Only in December 1994 were the
National Investment Funds incorporated, and the distribution of share certificates
has been envisaged for autumn 1995. ; .-..•••.
As regards the differential performance of the Czech and the Polish in-
vestment funds, no evidence is available so far. It has been argued that the spon-
taneous evolution of investment funds as in the Czech Republic may be detrimen-
tal to the evolution of concentrated shareholdings of the funds (EBRD, 1995,
pp. 137). hi addition, due to the danger of conflicts of interest, Czech investment
funds may be less willing to engage into active enterprise restructuring than the
Polish funds. At the same time, the more centralized approach to the establish-
ment of funds in Poland may allow more concentrated ownership structures to
evolve. Yet, these concerns against the spontaneous evolution of investment
funds appear to have little relevance. First of all, Czech investment funds did in
fact try to compose concentrated portfolios of shares but their shareholdings are
restricted by law. Second, conflicts of interest are also likely to arise in Polish in-34
vestment funds because of the ownership links between the funds and commercial
banks. At the same time, the involvement of the Polish government in setting up
the investment funds has delayed the privatization process and is unlikely to have
created a more efficient market structure.
Hungary
In Hungary, debt restructuring has been organized in a centralized way up
to 1994 through the State Property Agency. Yet, a more decentralized approach
has been adopted recently. In the context of the bank consolidation program of
1994, banks have signed conciliation agreements with the Ministry of Finance.
These agreements require the participating banks to organize creditors' commit-
tees, including the government and other state organizations, by the end of March
1994. Because suppliers are not participating in these committees, the voting
power of government representatives typically exceeds that of corporate creditors
(Szanyi, 1995, p. 25). The committees have to submit restructuring proposals
within 60 days. These proposals can foresee debt forgiveness, debt-to -equity
swaps, or debt restructuring as means to deal with problem loans. The banks
were given time until the end of 1994 to evaluate the proposals made through
work-out units that had to be established. Generally, the conciliation agreements
remain in force until the end of 1995. The program is supervised by the Ministry




Thus far, little information is available regarding the outcome of the Hun-
garian bank consolidation program. Altogether more than 2,000 restructuring
proposals were submitted. Incidentally, banks invited more companies to partici-
pate in the program, albeit with limited success. Szanyi (1995) reports some pre-
liminary results which indicate that banks adopt a rather passive behavior. Only
one half of the firms submitted viable reorganization plans. This indicates that
quite substantial efforts would be needed on part of the banks to restructure firms,
but at the same time, banks lack the personnel to perform this task. It seems that
in most cases banks react to their shortage of qualified personnel by trying to sell
non-performing loans to the State Property Agency. Altogether roughly 20 per-
cent of the stock of enterprise credit were covered by the debt consolidation pro-
Even without this right, the influence of the government on the banking sector is
still quite substantial since the recapitalization program has raised government
ownership to more than 70 percent in five out of the participating 8 banks (Buch,
1996).35
grams. Out of these 149 billion Forint, debt restructuring cases had been com-
pleted for 30 billion or 20 percent by autumn 1995 (EBRD, 1995).
2. •- Legal Regulations of Financial Markets
The access of enterprises to external financial sources is also affected by
laws that regulate the access to the equity and to the bond market. These regula-
tions, in turn, have an impact on the system of corporate governance that is
evolving. The corporate law, stock market regulations, disclosure rules, or bank-
ruptcy regulations must be addressed in this, context.
Both, in the Czech Republic and in Hungary, the issuance of bonds re-
quires prior approval of the Ministry of Finance. Similarly, restrictions pertain to
the access to bond finance from abroad. In Hungary, only firms which have been
in operation for at least one year and which meet certain minimum disclosure
standards can issue bonds domestically. These regulations explain the compara-
tively moderate role that public bond offerings play for the financing of firms in
Eastern Europe (Section IV.3.2.). Access to bank lending is in most cases
cheaper and quicker than access to the bond market. Yet, one of the major ob-
stacles to raising bank credit is the lack of reliable frameworks for the provision
of collateral. Central registers for mortgages, clear seniority rules, and a reliable
legal framework are often lacking in the economies under review (Bear/Gray,
1994, pp. 23). Only by the end of 1995, Poland plans to establish a central regis-
ter for mortgages in order to prevent double-pledging from occurring (Standard
and Poor's, 1995).
As regards access to the equity market, the rights and possibilities of out-
side shareholders to control management are decisive. Because the separation of
ownership and control - and thus the corporate governance problem - is most
pronounced in large joint stock companies, the following analysis wili focus on
these legal entities. All countries under review have adopted a general governance
structure consisting of a board of directors which is in charge of the firm's daily
operations and a supervisory board which ideally adopts a more long-term view
of the firm. Czech corporate law, for example, distinguishes the executive board
as being in charge of directing management from the supervisor}' board which
oversees the firm's financial and legal affairs. Owners and thus also representa-
tives of investment funds can in principle be represented in both bodies which36
tends to increase their control over the firms in question (Brom/Orenstein, 1994,
p. 910;Frensch, 1994, p. 51).
With respect to the protection of minority interests, Hungary explicitly al-
lows for small shareholders which combined shares account for at least 10 per-
cent of total share capital to call up a general shareholders' meeting. Here, share-
holders which represent at least 50 percent of the capital must be present for a
quorum of the shareholders meeting. In the Czech Republic, in contrast, only 30
percent suffice, and this rule can be changed by company statutes, giving more
flexibility to potential agreements with investors (Gray, 1993). Provided that
other preconditions are met, no quorum is required in Polish joint stock compa-
nies.
In the countries under review, stakeholders have quite different rights and
incentives to force firms into bankruptcy or to threaten to do so in order to im-
prove performance. First of all, Hungary has been the first country in the region to
enforce a bankruptcy law, which included an automatic trigger clause, in 1991.
Yet, because the automatic trigger led to large scale bankruptcy petitions with the
Hungarian courts, it was eased later on. The Czech Republic and Poland, in con-
trast, have been much more hesitant with subjecting firms to an effective bank-
ruptcy threat, thus eventually perpetuating the existence soft budget constraints.
Although a bankruptcy law had been passed in the Czech Republic already in
1991, it did not come into force prior to April 1993. Similarly in Poland, the
bankruptcy law of 1934 has not yet come to its full enforcement. Furthermore, the
definition 6f a bankruptcy case remains vague. Second, the countries assign dif-
ferent seniority rights to creditors. Most importantly, Hungary and Poland require
taxes and social security payments to be paid in advance of other creditors. If
anything, this provision should provide disincentives to large creditors to initiate a
bankruptcy proceeding as they can expect that their loan recovery rate will be
small. Creditor passivity may thus be promoted. In Hungary, this creditor passiv-
ity seems to have characterized the behavior of banks at least until 1993. Between
1992 and 1993, banks filed petitions for bankruptcies of firms in a mere 1.5 per-
cent of the cases (Gray/Schlorke/Szanyi, 1995, p. 30). The bulk of cases (67.5
percent) was initiated by other, non-bank creditors, followed by the cases initi-
ated by the firm itself (18 percent), or by the government (13 percent).
All countries have established or re-opened, respectively, their stock mar-
kets during the reform process. In June 1990, the Budapest Stock Exchange was
the first to open, followed by the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 1991, and the Pra-37
gue stock market in 1993. Yet, weak information and regulatory structures are
currently preventing the stock markets from playing a major role in these econo-
mies. Thus far, the operations of stock markets do offer little progress with re-
spect to improving the flow of information on firms and of firm performance
through take-over threats. This is evidenced by the Czech situation. Although two
official markets for company shares, the Prague stock exchange and the com-
puterized RM-system, exist, about 80 percent of total trading is made in private,
over-the-counter markets (Matesova/Seda, 1994, p. 33). Hence, little to no infor-
mation is available regarding the trading volume and the prices in this major seg-
ment of the capital market. Incidentally, access to the RM-system is more liberal
since it only depends on the payment of a certain fee rather than on membership
as in the stock exchange. Yet, investors have increasingly focused their activities
on the official stock market, as far as recorded transactions are concerned.
Whereas the RM-market accounted for 24.4 percent of the volume of all
(recorded) trades in 1993, its share had gone down to a mere 2.6 percent in the
first half of 1995 (CNB, 1995, p. 58). New stock market legislation that is cur-
rently pending aims at a greater protection of minority shareholders and at provid-
ing an improved legal background for company takeovers (Planecon, 1995).
3. Financial Market Structure
The previous discussion has shown that legal regulations as well as institu-
tional bottlenecks which are inherent to financial markets may prevent firms' ac-
cess to external financial sources. This section presents some empirical evidence
as to the actual importance of different financial sources in the countries under
review.
3.1. The Financial Structure of Firms
Different initial conditions, regulations of the financial system as well as
the quality of information systems can be expected to have an impact on the fi-
nancial structure of •firms. Such information could be obtained for the Czech Re-
public and for Poland.
3
8 A first look at the financial structure of Czech firms re-
External financing through interenterprise credit has furthermore caused particular
concerns during the transformation process because it was feared that interenter-
prise debt would have negative feedback effects on the conduct of monetary policy
and on the stability of the financial system. Yet, although the empirical evidence
on the importance of interenterprise debt is somewhat scattered, most authors now
seem to agree that the observed increase of interenterprise debt during the transi-38
veals that their financing pattern is more similar to firms in developed countries
than to those of the subsample of developing countries (Section III.4.). This dif-
ference between the sample of developing countries and the emerging market
economies in terms of the importance of new equity finance is most likely to be
explained with the presence of some basic financial market structure in the former
group of countries. At the same time, stock markets and the needed institutional
arrangements were completely lacking in Eastern Europe under the socialist sys-
tem. °

















































Sources: Frensch (1994, p. 49); OECD (1994a).
In 1994, retained earnings accounted for 65 percent of total financing in the
Czech Republic (Table 5). Bank borrowing was also relatively important with
25 percent, reaching an even greater share than in 1993 (17 percent). This finan-
cing pattern, however, had changed significantly during the transformation period.
While Czechoslovak enterprises in 1989 could finance 77 percent of their invest-
ment out of retained earnings, this share dropped to only 23 percent in 1990 as a
response to the transformation-induced decline in enterprise profitability. Inciden-
tally, this value roughly corresponds to the pre-reform level of the 1980s (Capek,
1994). Since 1991, retained earnings gradually became more important as a
source of finance.
tion period was an adjustment to the pattern observed in developed market
economies rather than the indicator of a deep systematic crisis (Belka/Krajewski,
1994, p. 14; Bonin/Schaffer, 1994, pp. 13; Brom/Orenstein, 1994, p. 902; Dittos,
1994, p. 348).39
In Poland, the importance of bank credit as a source of finance for in-
vestment projects declined from 20.4 to 17 percent between 1990 and 1993
(Vinton, 1995). Private sector firms, in contrast, financed only 12.3 percent of in-
vestment from bank loans. Additional evidence on the financial structure of Polish
firms can be gained from the results of a survey of 200 enterprises which reflects
the situation at the end of 1993 (Belka at al., 1994, pp. 29). The survey shows
that 18 percent of state-owned firms had negative equity. Leverage was lowest in
private and corporatized firms where equity was twice as high as total debt in 38
and 46 percent of all firms, respectively. This finding is also confirmed by
Groszek (1995, p. 22) who reports that small and mid-sized Polish enterprises fi-
nance 77.4 percent of their investment from their own savings.
Yet, the low leverage ratios of private firms should not a priori be taken as
a signal that these firms are excluded from the,credit market. Rather, private firms
in Poland find it comparatively easy to obtain banks loans. Belka et al. (1994)
find that only 10-15 percent of private firms but 35-40 percent of state-owned
firms were refused bank credits. For private firms, the main reason for a refusal of
a loan was the lack of collateral, for state-owned firms their poor financial situa-
tion. Bear and Gray (1994, p. 38) show furthermore that Polish banks prefer to
lend to new firms and to firms with a high share of fixed assets. This implies that
Polish banks try to overcome informational asymmetries with respect to the pri-
vate sector by relying on self-selection mechanisms.
As regards the role of banks in the financing of new private manufacturing
firms in the initial reform period, the surveys of Webster (1992a, 1992b) and
Swanson/Webster (1992) give additional insights.
3
9 In Poland, more than two-
thirds of private firms had obtained bank credit until early 1991 while the remain-
ing firms had not applied for a loan because of high interest rates. According to
the survey, firms that were willing to pay the current interest rate received bank
finance, and banks had been rather flexible in defining assets acceptable as col-
lateral. Similarly, in former Czechoslovakia, private firms had fairly little prob-
lems in obtaining bank finance. About two thirds of all firms included in the
sample had received bank credit during the first six months of their operations.
Yet, this extension of credit to the private sector may have been overly expansive.
Banks thus started to raise interest rates and to increasingly demand the provision
of collateral towards the end of the survey period. In Hungary, in contrast, banks
39 The surveys were conducted in May 1991 (Poland), September 1991 (Hungary),
and January 1992 (former Czechoslovakia) in about 100 domestically-owned, pri-
vate firms in each country.40
had already been relatively conservative in financing start-ups early on. Hence,
only 11 percent of the enterprises surveyed had received a bank loan after 6
months of operations. Generally, bank lending to new firms in Hungary tended to
come at a later stage and with a shorter maturity than in former Czechoslovakia
and in Poland.
According to aggregated data on the lending portfolios of commercial
banks, the share of the private sector in total domestic credit has increased sub-
stantially in the Czech Republic and in Poland since the onset of reforms. Compa-
rable data for Hungary have not been available. In the Czech Republic, the pri-
vate sector increased its share in lending to enterprises from a mere 0.1 percent in
1989 to 69.9 percent at the end of 1994. In Poland, this increase was somewhat
less drastic with a share of 10.1 percent in 1990 as compared to 55.7 percent in
1994. Yet, in particular in the Czech case, these numbers are misleading because
many enterprises were merely reclassified during voucher privatization while no
real changes may have taken place in the lending behavior of banks. Furthermore,
since 1992, cooperatives are not treated separately from the private sector, thus
additionally overstating the private's sector credit share. All countries under re-
view have established subsidized lending facilities and credit guarantee schemes
for small private enterprises. In Poland, a new local network of credit guarantee
funds is currently being organized (EBRD, 1995). Yet, the capitalization of the
fund with 25 million Zloty or less than 1 percent of total enterprise credit is rather
modest.
3.2. Importance of Non-Bank Financial Intermediation
Information about the financial structure of firms can also be obtained from
data about the importance of non-bank financial intermediaries (Table 6). Thus
far, venture capital could make only a very limited contribution to the financing of
firms. This item has been most important in Hungary and Poland, reaching
roughly 3.7 percent of the value of the outstanding loans to enterprises in 1994. In
the Czech Republic, however, venture capital finance was less than one percent
of the stock of bank credit. Although in the Czech Republic the value of enter-
prise shares is about 18 percent of the value of bank loans, the figure says little
about the amount of new equity which could be raised through the stock market.
Rather, the high degree of stock market capitalization is the reflection of the
voucher privatization program under which large amounts of equity were con-
verted into publicly traded shares. In Hungary, the face value of total shares41
(including those of financial firms) amounted to only 5 percent of the stock of
enterprise debt in early 1994. For Poland, again, only data about the total capita-
lization of the stock market are available. Taking into account that shares issued
by banks account for about 30 percent of this number (Planecon, 1995b), stock
market capitalization is only 12 percent of total bank lending to enterprises. Even
though in the Czech Republic 19 bond issues were made between 1990 and 1993
(Matesova/Seda, 1994), industry bonds have a value of only 2.9 percent of the
stock of enterprise credit, Overall, enterprise bonds account for 5.4 percent of all
bonds outstanding (CSU, 1994).
Table 6 — Indicators of Non-Bank Financial Intermediation, 1993-1994.
Czech Republic Hungary Poland
;
 !
(in percent of stock of enterprise credit)








? 9 Face value of securities
(enterprises)
(in percent of stock of domestic credit)
Size of venture capital 0.7 1.2 1.7
funds
AH 1 S 9 9 7
Stock market capitaliza- .. '•
tion (total)
Face value of securities . 5.4 18.9
(total)
Data as of December 1993 (Czech Republic, stock markets), February 1994
(Hungary), mid-1994 (Czech Republic, security markets), and November 1994
(Poland). — a) Total market capitalization minus 30 percent in shares of com-
mercial banks.
Sources: Banks and Exchanges (1994); Business Central Europe (1995); CSU
(1994, p. 131); Frensch (1994, p. 34).
Table 7 provides some more evidence with respect to the structure of the
stock markets in the countries under review and compares these indicators with
those of three West European economies. As could already be seen from Table 6,
stock market capitalization relative to GDP is by far the largest in the Czech Re-
public - even exceeding that of the Western economies - while Hungary and Po-42
land lag substantially behind. At the same time, however, the Czech stock market
is relatively illiquid as compared to the volume of shares traded. Market turnover
relative to market capitalization is only 11.0 percent as compared to values well
above 100 percent in the cases of Poland, Greece, or Portugal. Mainly, this re-
flects the fact that technical facilities and information systems in the Czech Re-
public are incapable of dealing with the number of publicly traded shares that
have been issued during voucher privatization. Comparing market turnover to
GDP, it turns out that stock markets are of much smaller importance in the Czech
Republic and in Poland than in Germany while reaching a similar order of magni-
tude as in Portugal (about 30 percent). Interestingly, Hungary lags far behind with
respect to this measure since market turnover only reaches a volume of 12.2 per-
cent of GDP.
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Source: EBRD (1995, p. 168).43
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has tried to achieve two goals. First, it addressed the question
which type of financial system would benefit the transition economies. Second,
the paper presented some empirical evidence regarding the actual structures of the
financial systems that are emerging.
Generally, it was found that efficient banks can contribute to a better ac-
cess of new private firms to the credit market as well as to an enhanced corporate
governance of state-owned firms during the privatization process. Considering the
urgently needed improvements in the corporate control of large enterprises, the
transition economies can in particular benefit from the adoption of a universal
banking system. Universal banks as being debt and equity holders of firm at the
same time can potentially impose an optimal control structure on the firms, they
can be sources of long-term finance, and they can contribute to real sector re-
structuring.
Yet, it was also pointed out that the adoption of a universal banking system
entails substantial risks for the nascent market economies. Holding debt
and equity of a firm raises a bank's exposure to firm-specific risks and may lead
to conflicts of interest within the bank, thus lowering bank efficiency. These risks
are particularly pronounced in the Eastern European setting because of the inex-
perience of bank managers, because of weak incentive systems within banks, and
because of interlocking ownership between banks and enterprises. The only way
to reduce most of the resulting risks, however, would not only be the prohibition
of universal banking but also of other commercial banking activities. Yet, under
such a narrow banking system, important efficiency gains would be sacrificed.
In view of the risks of universal banking, general policy guidelines are dif-
ficult to prescribe. Rather, country-specific factors such as, most importantly, the
degree to which the government has refrained from interfering with the decision
making processes within the banks must be considered when deciding to which
degree universal banking should be permitted. Also, the determination of the gov-
ernment to push forward policies towards hardening the budget constraints of
banks and enterprises is a lackmus-test for the adaptation of market principle in
banking. In most banks in the countries under review, governments are no more
directly being involved in the lending decisions. Yet, their remaining ownership
stakes potentially give them great leverage over management decisions. Hence,44
quickly privatizing the remaining stakes would make the banking systems less
inclined to take on politically-motivated risks and would make them more stable.
Generally, it was proposed that commercial banks should be allowed°to
perform investment banking activities and to hold limited amounts of equity in
enterprises. Banks should be required to fully provision against these equityhold-
ings, and state-owned banks which are merely executing orders of-governments
or of central banks should be substantially restricted in their exposure to enter-
prise shares. Adopting a subsidiary-type universal banking structure may reduce
the potential for conflicts of interest and may furthermore ease the supervision of
the banks.
At the same time, the governments need to create legal and regulatory
frameworks that allow banks and other financial intermediaries to perform their
functions in an economy. Essential elements of such a reform strategy are the
strengthening of banking supervision, deposit insurance reform, improvements in
the corporate control of (state-owned) banks, the enforcement of a bankruptcy
threat for banks, and improvements in the information systems, notably the adap-
tation of disclosure requirements. Setting a clear time-table for the privatization of
banks and enterprises is furthermore essential for improving incentive mecha-
nisms. In addition, the legal framework for the collaterization of bank lending
must be determined. Incidentally, this is one measure which can help to improve
access of new private firms to the credit market. While all countries under review
have made substantial improvements in these areas, reforms to date have been
rather gradual and are still being incomplete.
Even if the above reform steps have been successfully implemented, bank-
ing in the transition economies will remain inherently risky for a considerable
amount of time. Financial contracts which are conditioned upon uncertain future
cash flows are concluded in a rapidly changing institutional environment. Hence,
even if the needed structural reforms have been implemented, positive net present
value firms may still be confined to self-finance simply because outsiders cannot
evaluate projects or because they deem the risk that they observe as being too
high. A similar conclusion applies to the ability of the stock market to provide
effective corporate governance. Currently, these markets are rather shallow and
illiquid, thus not providing investors with the institutional preconditions needed
for effective outsider control. All countries have enacted disclosure requirements
for publicly traded firms, and have - with the exception of Poland - explicitly45
prohibited insider trading. These regulations, however, need time until they are
effectively and fully being implemented.
Turning to the empirical analysis that this paper was able to provide, it is
immediately clear that solid evidence on the functioning of financial markets and
of corporate governance systems in Eastern Europe is still lacking. This lack of
information is not unique to these countries. Even the functioning of corporate
governance systems in developed market economies is not very well understood
due to a lack of microeconomic data on the issue. Despite this obvious shortcom-
ing, the paper could find some common patterns in the countries, under review
which allow some tentative conclusions to be drawn. First of all, all countries
have opted for. some kind of universal banking system with restrictions on in-
vestment banking activities being strictest in the case of Hungary. In all countries,
banks can hold equity in firms. Direct involvement of banks in the restructuring of
firms has actively been sought by the Polish, more recently also by the Hungarian
authorities. In the Czech Republic, such a role has evolved more spontaneously
through the banks' involvement in the investment fund structure.
Generally, however, banks seem to be relatively cautious regarding their
actual involvement in enterprise restructuring, in particular to the extent that it
would require the acquisition of equity stakes in firms. Partly, this observed reluc-
tance is the result of regulatory hurdles, to a major extent, however, it also re-
flects the banks' presumption that the risks from such engagements would out-
weigh the informational advantages that the banks may have. Seen from this an-
gle, there is thus little evidence for the hypothesis that banks do not consider the
risks of their activities. The risks which are in fact evident in the Eastern Euro-
pean banking systems primarily stem from traditional commercial banking activi-
ties. A lack of loan assessment skills, the maintenance of at least a partial auto-
matic deposit insurance system as well as substantial amounts of non-performing
loans on the balance sheets of banks remain a threat to a lasting stability in the
banking sectors.
In order to solve these problems, recapitalizations of banks should not be
considered. Instead, banks should be given more leeway to provision against their
non-performing loans. By clarifying seniority issues, banks can furthermore be
provided with greater incentives to engage in the restructuring of firms and pos-
sibly to recover some of their bad loans. The results of the Polish restructuring
law show that banks made use of the role that was assigned to them through the
bank conciliation method. Such decentralized debt restructuring utilizes the46
learning potential of banks and may lay the basis for a more solid loan assessment
in the future.
Information about the access of private firms to the loan market was par-
ticularly difficult to obtain. If anything, private enterprises have to rely on re-
tained earnings as a source of finance to a greater extent than firms on average.
This can be attributed to two factors. First, private enterprises tend to be more ef-
ficient than state-owned enterprises, thus allowing them to finance expansion
trough internally generated sources. Second, private firms may have been credit
rationed to some extent. Hence, only those firms would actually remain in the
market that could earn sufficiently large short-term cash flows. Evidence on the
behavior of banks indeed indicates that asymmetries in information prevail. Banks
often^ postpone the provision of new loans until firms have a sufficiently long
track record, and they typically require collateral to be pledged.
As regards the remaining obstacles to efficient financial systems, the coun-
tries would benefit from more closely involving foreign institutions into the proc-
ess. While technical assistance has actively been sought and used already, the
market access of foreign banks has not always been treated that favorably. Yet,
considering the capital that is needed in order to privatize the state-owned banks
and the competitive pressure that some of the very dominant successor banks
need to be exposed to, it is hardly conceivable how improvements could be made
without tapping foreign sources. Competitive pressure exerted through foreign
banks can impose substantial adjustment pressure on the large state-owned banks
and force them to improve their operational efficiency.
4
0 At the same time, fears
that foreign banks would put the overall viability of domestic banks at risk appear
misplaced. The evidence so far implies that new foreign market entrants tend to
occupy certain market niches rather than entering the traditional banking business
on a large scale. More specifically, remaining obstacles to the market entry of
foreign banks should be removed even before the final deadline specified in the
Europe Agreements of 1991 and to seek close cooperations with foreign banking
supervisors. These agreements in principle allow differential treatment of domes-
tic and foreign banks to be maintained until the year 2001.
40 Note that this argument applies only to those foreign banks that have their origins
in developed Western market economies with strict banking supervisory systems.
As regards foreign banks originating from other formerly socialist countries, nota-
bly some successor states of the Soviet Union, the reform states under review may
want to be more selective when granting new licenses.47
APPENDIX
Table 8 — Indicators of Corporate Governance Structures in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland.














nuary' 1992), Act No.
]04/1990 "On Joint Stock
Companies".
Companies with limited li-
ability which shares may
be freely traded. Minimum
capital: 1 mil. Czech
Crowns. Securities law is
pending which would re-
quire notification of share-
holdings exceeding certain
thresholds.
30 percent quorum of
nominal capital is needed.
Quorum and voting rules
can be changed by com-
pany statutes.
Must have a minimum of 3
members, elected by
GSM. Manages company.
Same person cannot be on
BoD and on SB. Owners
can be present on both
boards.
Minimum of 3 members,
elected by GSM. In enter-
prises with more than 50
employees, 1/3-1/2 of
members must be elected
by employees. Has




Minimum share capital is
set at 10 mil. Forint. For-
eigners can only buy regis-
tered shares. Shares result-
ing from management and
employee buy-outs cannot
freely be traded. Share
1
holders with more than
10 % of votes must notify
Securities Commission
and GSM before acquiring
an additional 2 %.
GSM has a quorum if
more than half of the
shares with voting rights
are present. Statutes may
require higher quorum.
Minority shareholders
which hold at least 10%
of the shares can call a
GSM and request manage-
ment activities to be re-
viewed by the SB.
Elected by GSM. Mem-
bers of BoD cannot run
business under their own
name which is similar to
that of the company that
they manage.
If employment exceeds
200, at least one third of
the SB must be elected by
the employees.
Law on Economic Activity,
Polish Commercial Code
(1934, with later amend-
ments).
Minimum capital is 1 bil.
Zloty with each share be-
ing worth at least
500,000 Zloty. Sharehold-
ings exceeding certain
thresholds must be noti-
fied. Public offer is re-
quired for shares ex-
ceeding 33 %.
Generally, the GSM is
valid regardless of the




for at least 10 % of shares
can call GSM. Proxy-
voting is possible.
Has one or more members.
Shareholders can be mem-
bers of BoD. Elected by
GSM for a maximum of 3
years.
Mandatory for any firm
with capital in excess of 5
mil. Zloty. Must have a
minimum of 5 members.
Has authority to dismiss
all members of BoD.48
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System of collateral is un-
derdeveloped and no cen-
tral register of mortgages
exists.
Nominal face value of
bonds must be a minimum
of 1.000 Czech Crowns. A
licence of the MoF is
needed for the issuance of
bonds.
Act on Securities and the
Stock Exchange (1990).
Although mortgages have
been possible for a long
time under Hungarian law,
poor collection methods
and disincentives of
creditors due to seniority
regulations disfavour use
of collateral.
Companies can to a certain
extent issue interest-
bearing shares and other
debt instruments. Pre-
conditions for a bond issue
are that (i) company has
been in operation for more
than 1 year, (ii) has pub-
lished prospectus, (iii) en-
trusts issuance to public
trader. A licence is needed
for the issuance of securi-
ties abroad.
Secured creditors do not
have priority claims. Not
the first but rather the last
lien has priority. Legisla-
tion pending which seeks
to establish central register
for collateral.
Market for enterprise
bonds is rather underdev-
loped, the majority of
bonds in circulation has
been issued by the gov-






















can be performed in one
bank.
Need to be notified and
approved if they exceed 10
% of the firm's capital or
if the sum of all equity
holdings exceeds 25 % of
the bank's •capital. Limits
do not apply for debt-to-
equity swaps for 2 years
(deadline can be extended
by the Czech National
Bank) or for shares





task of the central bank.
Although banks have been
privatized in voucher
scheme, government re-
tains majority stakes in the
largest banks. Large banks
have SB with 12 members,
elected for 4-year term.
BoD consists of 7 mem-
bers. SB may appoint 2
members of BoD.







banks cannot hold more
than 15 % (40 %) of their
capital in stakes in one en-
terprise. Equity holdings
cannot exceed 60 % of the
bank's capital. They are
unrestricted for 6 months
if acquired through debt-




dation Agreements as part
of the recapitalization pro-
gram.
Banking supervision is the
task of the State Banking
Supervision. By autumn
1995, only one large Hun-
garian bank has been pri-
vatized. BoD has 6-8
members. Since 1994 (No-
vember), CEO of a state-,
owned bank cannot be




amended 1992). Law on




can be performed in one
bank.
Banks cannot hold more
than 25 % of their capital
in enterprise shares (up to
50 % upon permission of
National Bank of Poland).
Debt-to-equity swaps are
possible.
Banks have de facto lead
role in debt restructuring
under debt conciliation
procedures.
Banking supervision is the
task of the central bank.
Government retains own-
ership of 6 out of nine
commercialized banks as
well, as of specialized
banks, SB (Bank Council)
has 5-10 members, elected
for 3-year terms. Dismis-
ses and appoints President
of BoD (3-8 members, 3-
year term).50
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ket (RM) have been in op-
eration since 1993. Se-
curities can be traded off
the exchange if stock mar-
ket regulation allows for
this option. Security deal-
ers need licence of the
MoF which is also in
charge of supervising ex-
changes (through com-
missioner of stock ex-
changes). Centre for secu-
rities organized by the
MoF records book-entries
of securities. Members of
stock exchange have es-
tablished guarantee fund.
Foreigners can buy and
sell shares. Pending legis-
lation intends to make
take-overs more difficult
and to protect minority
shareholdings.
Prospectus must contain
data on issue, financial
status, issuer's business
and the characteristics of
the security. It must be
verified by a bank. Disclo-
sure requirements were
only weakly enforced until
late 1993 for public joint-
stock companies.
Act on securities and the
Stock Exchange (1990).
Budapest Stock Exchange
opened in 1990. Operates
as a self-governing, self-
regulatory institution un-
der the State Securities
Surveillance of the Minis-
try of Finance. Licences of
the MoF are needed for
security dealers. Limits on
the cross-holdings of
shares among security
dealers apply. Listed se-
curities cannot be traded
off the official exchange.
Stricter requirements apply
to listed than to unlisted
securities. Prospectus must
be approved by the Securi-
ties Surveillance and by
the National Bank. Public
offering must be made
through licensed under-
writer.
Act on Public Trading and
Trust Funds (1991).
Warsaw Stock Exchange
opened in 1991. It is
owned by 26 shareholders,
one of them being the
Treasury. Trading takes
place on 4 sessions per
week. Stock market legis-
lation is intended to con-
form with EU-standards
and follows the French
model. Supervision is per-
formed through the Stock
Exchange Supervision
Board.
Submission of share pro-
spectus with information
on economic activities, fi-
nancial data etc. is re-
quired. Prospectus must be
published in two national
newspapers. Publicly tra-
ded securities must have a
share value of at least 1
mil. ECU, and at least
20 % must be publicly of-
fered.51
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well as prohibition to use
confidential information
have been enacted. Stock




ing to the Stock Exchange
Act but stricter require-
ments can be imposed
through stock market
regulations. Information
must be disclosed annu-
ally, quarterly as well as
upon relevant changes in
the business conditions.
Insider trading, trading in
own securities, and trading
in securities in which
trader has significant influ-
ence is prohibited. Trader
must prove that he has not
used insider information.
Public issuance of shares
requires disclosure of rele-
vant business information.
Annual and quarterly re-
porting as well as reports
on changes in relevant
business characteristics is
mandatory. Special disclo-
sure requirements apply to
investment fund securities.
Investor protection is not
explicitely regulated. In-
terests are intended to be
protected through the gov-
ernment and the chairman
of Securities Commission
Joint stock companies
must publish annual tax
return and annual report.
No standard format for fi-
nancial statements applies.
Publicly traded firms must
provide investors with ac-
cess to full information oh
assets, financial standing,






(IC) and Investment Pri-
vatization Funds (IPF)
Act (1992).
IPFs are prevented from
investing more than 10 %
of their assets in one firm.
Holdings of one IPF or of
a group of IPFs cannot ex-
ceed 20 % of a company's
shares. This limit, is in-
tended to protect minority
shareholders. ICs can cre-
ate open- or closed-end
mutual funds. ICs and
IPFs are subject to state
supervision. IPFs have
largely been converted
into unit trusts in order to
prevent managers from
take-overs.
Law on Investment Funds
(1991).
Capital of investment
funds was 20 mil. US-






60 % of shares of firms to
be privatized. Population
buys share certificates
which can be exchanged
for shares in the Funds.
15 % of Investment Fund
shares are retained for re-
muneration of its manag-























creditors and has not been
able to service debt 'over a
long period of time'.
No automatic trigger. Peti-
tion may be brought in by
debtor, creditor, or liqui-
daton Creditors must as-
sert claims within 30 days.
(1) expenditures of trustee,
(2) secured creditors, (3)
workers, (4) taxes, fees,




debtor remains in control
of assets and can postpone
interest payments. Maxi-
mum protection period
lasts 90 days. Instead of





Company has not serviced
debt for 90 days
Automatic trigger was
abandoned in late 1993.
Personal accountability of
managers.
(1) costs of liquidation
incl. wages, mortgage
claims, employee benefits,
taxes, (2) secured and un-
secured creditors, -penalties
for tax arrears, (3) other.
Compromise agreement
(out-of-court agreement)
which does not require
creditor unanimity. Protec-
tion period similar to
Chapter 11-regulations.
Nonjudicial workout pro-
cedure has been adopted.
Agreements bind only the
negotiating parties
(government agreed to go
along on a pro rata basis).
Bankruptcy Act of 1934,
Insolvency Act of February
1990.
Failure to meet debt pay-
ment obligations. Gener-
ally not applied to SOEs.
Petition through creditor
or debtor possible. Per-
sonal accountability of
managers.
(1) court costs, (2) bank-
ruptcy costs, (3) tax ar-
rears (of past 2 years), (4)
social insurance fund (of
past year), (5) medical or
funeral expenses, (6) nor-
mal creditors, (7) interest
payments, (8) other.
Liquidations as one form
of transforming SOEs re-
quire only consulting role
of workers' council. Mu-
tual agreements, according
to law of 1934, can only
be initiated through deb-
tor. Bank conciliation
agreements assign banks a
lead role in debt re-
structuring cases provided
that banks receive ap-
proval of 50 % of out-
standing debt.53
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Czech Republic Hungary Poland
Government retains ulti-




'Basic' SOEs are governed
by a Supervisory Council,
'public interest' SOEs di-
rectly by a state institution.
Laws on State Enterprises
and on Self-Management
(1981) still apply to a
number of SOEs. In public




have great impact on deci-
sions.
(7) Role of the Government retains ulti- Law on Enterprise Conn-
government mate control in state- cils (Law No. 33/1984)
distinguishes two main
types of SOEs. In utilities
and in strategic firms, di-
rect state control is main-
tained, in other SOEs,
workers' councils are de
jure important while de
facto management retains
most control. Government
can retain a golden share
under which 33.3 % of
shares ensure-51 % of the
voting rights.
BoD = Board of Directors, GSM = General Shareholder Meeting, IC = Investment Company, IPF =
Investment Privatization Fund, MoF = Ministry of Finance, SB = Supervisory Board.
Sources: Bartkiewicz/Bledowski (1995), Bear/Gray (1994), Bonin (1995), Brom/Orenstein (1994),
EBRD (1994, 1995), Earle/Frydman/Rapaczynski et al. (1993), Gray (1993), Matesova/Seda
(1994), Ministry of Finance (Hungary) (1991, 1992), Planecon (1995a), SBS (1994), Polish De-
velopment Bank (1994), Polish Society of Economic, Legal, and Court Translators (1995),
Standard and Poor's (1995), Trade Links (1995a, 1995b), Wall Street Journal (8./9.12.1995),
Wolff/Thompson/Nelson (199.2). >54
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